The implementation of MiFID has lead to a fragmentation of liquidity in European equity trading. We analyze the long-term effects of MiFID on liquidity with a new sample of Swiss stocks and do not find evidence for a worsening of market quality. In contrast, spread and depth measures indicate a general increase in market quality. Given the non-existence of a consolidated tape in Europe, we examine whether trade-throughs prevent the emergence of a virtually consolidated market. We find evidence that trade-throughs originate from informed traders with a priority of execution speed over price and conclude that the occurrence of trade-throughs does not indicate an inferior market quality. We are grateful to Thomson Reuters for providing data. We also thank Yakov Amihud and the participants of the 2010 Topics in Finance seminar for insightful comments.
Introduction
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) was adopted by 2 See Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field, ECC (1993) .
3 See Art. 14(3) of the directive. We contribute to the literature on the effects of liquidity fragmentation in Europe in three important aspects. First, our study helps to understand the effects of liquidity fragmentation in the European equities markets. Although a number of studies analyzed liquidity fragmentation in U.S. markets, there is a gap in the analysis of long-term effects of the implementation of MiFID and the related fragmentation of liquidity for European stocks. Second, we concentrate on institutional differences between U.S. and European equities markets by the analysis of trade-throughs. In Europe there is neither a consolidated tape nor a rule prohibiting trade-throughs. But still literature analyzing these differences is insufficient. Hendershott & Jones (2005) analyze the relaxation of the trade-through prohibition for the three most active ETFs in the U.S. market and its effects on market quality. Although they find no evidence for negative effects on market quality, they conclude that this could be related to the high liquidity of the ETFs analyzed. Our study is related to who analyze quote quality and trade-throughs for a sample of UK blue-chip stocks. However, our contribution is to provide evidence that trade-throughs originate from informed traders with a priority of execution speed over price. Third, we analyze a new and comprehensive long-term set of data. Where most studies on competition and fragmentation are laid out as event studies with a comparably short after event period, our analysis covers 20 months, which makes an investigation of long-term effects possible. Additionally, to our best knowledge, we are the first to analyse explicitly stocks from Switzerland, which is not a member of the European Union and, therefore, to a lesser extent affected by
MiFID.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature and Section 3 outlines the data. Section 4 presents measures of liquidity and fragmentation, while Section 5 analyzes trade-throughs.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
There is a large body of literature, which analyzes the effects of liquidity fragmentation on market quality on a theoretical and empirical level. However, it is inconclusive about the question, whether fragmentation leads to an increase or decrease in market quality (see also Degryse (2009 and Chlistalla & Lutat (2011) ).
Centralized trading reduces search and coordination costs for traders and could, therefore, be the optimal framework regarding market quality. Pagano (1989) and Chowdhry & Nanda (1991) argue that liquidity tends to concentrate on one trading venue. Mendelson (1987) and Madhavan (1995) analyze theoretically the effects of liquidity fragmentation and show that fragmentation can decrease market quality. In Madhavan (1995) a model which explains liquidity fragmentation in the context of disclosure is proposed. In this model fragmentation can decrease market quality, but due to heterogenous preferences of market participants regarding disclosure of their trades, liquidity not necessarily concentrates. Amihud, Lauterbach & Mendelson (2003) provide empirical evidence for benefits of consolidation by the analysis of corporate warrants from the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. However, they state that the cost of fragmentation is likely to be reduced under advanced trading systems. Bennett & Wei (2006) find improved market quality in terms of liquidity provision and price efficiency for stocks that switched from NASDAQ to the NYSE. This improvement is attributed to order flow concentration. It increases market quality in particular for less liquid stocks while the competition among trading platforms could still improve market quality for highly liquid stocks. With a sample of NYSE and Nasdaq stocks O'Hara & Ye (2011) find no evidence for a decrease in market quality due to fragmentation. Moreover, fragmentation appears to be most beneficial for small stocks 11 . Christie 11 Regarding the findings of Bennett & Wei (2006) , O'Hara & Ye (2011) state that the findings of improved measures of market quality related to the move of the listing from Nasdaq to NYSE could be due to size effects of the stocks, rather than a consolidation of liquidity. According to O'Hara & Ye (2011) the stocks that move from Nasdaq to NYSE tend to be the larger Nasdaq firms due to the listing standards of the two exchanges. For larger Nasdaq firms O'Hara & Ye (2011) find no significant differences between fragmentation and consolidation.
& Schultz (1994) find evidence that NASDAQ market makers were able to earn rents by posting too wide spreads. When this was made public, spreads suddenly narrowed as shown in Christie, Harris & Schultz (1994) . These study show that the concentration of liquidity in one market place does not necessarily lead to competition among market makers and, therefore, does not fully enforce liquidity. In contrast, competition among trading venues may lead to better conditions, related services and lower prices for traders which could finally result in enhanced market quality. Boehmer & Boehmer (2003) find evidence for improved market quality for ETFs that started to trade on the NYSE after having been traded on other platforms, which they attribute to enhanced competition for order flow.
Several studies analyze the competition between NASDAQ and ECNs. Barclay, Hendershott & McCormick (2003) , e.g., conclude that ECN trading explains more of the stock-price variance than trading on NASDAQ and thus ECNs are able to attract more informed traders. Fink, Fink & Weston (2006) also find evidence for positive effects of enhanced competition between NASDAQ and ECNs and state that cost-competition for trading outweighs potentially negative effects driven by fragmentation.
The theoretical underpinning for effects of fragmentation on market quality follows two main strands. On the one hand positive network externalities through consolidation are emphasized, which means that fragmentation of liquidity should have negative effects on market quality. On the other hand competition among trading venues is seen as the main driver for enhanced market quality for the market participants. O'Hara & Ye (2011) argue that smart order routing, the existence of a consolidated tape and a rule prohibit-ing trade-throughs 12 lead to a virtual consolidation of U.S. equity markets although fragmentation has increased. This hypothesis combines the two strands of argumentation by explaining how increased competition through fragmentation leads to increased market quality without the negative effects due to the loss of consolidation.
MiFID however neither requires a consolidated tape, nor prohibits trade- There are comparably few empirical studies analyzing the effects of fragmentation of European equity trading related to the implementation of MiFID.
Hengelbrock & Theissen (2009) analyze the simultaneous market entry of
Turquoise in 14 European countries, the determinants of its market share 12 A trade-through is the execution of an order at a certain price, although a better price is offered on another exchange. Foucault & Menkveld (2008) ascribe high trade-through rates to investors not using smart routers to route their trades to the market offering the best available price. See Section 5 for more details. and the effects on market quality in terms of liquidity and bid-ask spreads.
Their main findings are that the market share of Turquoise is higher for firms with higher market capitalization, higher free float and lower volatility. A panel analysis provides evidence for a decrease in spreads and weak evidence for increased volume after the introduction of Turquoise. In another event study Chlistalla & Lutat (2011) analyze the market entry of Chi-X in France.
They provide evidence that market quality does not suffer from the entrance of a new competitor and the accompanying fragmentation of liquidity. Gresse change with its MTF EuroSETS in the Dutch stock market and the implications on the limit order market operated by Euronext. They find, that the consolidated order book after the entry of EuroSETS is deeper, i.e., overall liquidity is higher. Furthermore, they describe a negative relation between the rate of trade-throughs at the expense of EuroSETS and the liquidity supply on this market. With a high rate of trade-throughs for a particular stock, the probability of execution on EuroSETS is lower. Accordingly, the liquidity supply on EuroSETS would also be lower.
Riordan, analyze competition and market quality in fragmented markets for the FTSE 100 constituents across the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the three MTFs Chi-X, BATS Europe and Turquoise with a sample covering 29 trading days. They find evidence for an increase in market quality in terms of quoted spreads and a shift of price discovery from LSE towards Chi-X. analyze market coordination, i.e., arbitrage opportunities (crossed market quotes) and subotpimal executions (trade-throughs) within the same sample period and conclude that the competition among trading venues lead to an alignment of prices. A similar conclusion is drawn by Spankowski, Wagener & Burghof (2012) , who analyze intraday patterns on the LSE and three MTFs and find evidence for a convergence across different trading venues. Degryse, de Jong & van Kervel (2011) focus on the effects of dark trading on liquidity.
They find a negative impact of dark trading on liquidity, while evidence is provided that fragmentation increases liquidity.
Data
We conduct our analysis for the constituents of the SMI Expanded index that includes the 50 largest Swiss stocks. Stocks that are not traded on the three MTFs Chi-X, BATS Europe and Turquoise and stocks where data is not available are excluded. Our final sample in Table 1 To analyze size effects, we group the stocks into three subsamples according to their average daily market capitalization during the sample period. 13 Our data does not include iceberg orders and hidden liquidity. 14 Continuous trading on the Swiss exchange takes place between 09:00:00 (CET) and 17:20:00 (CET) followed by the closing auction, see SIX Swiss Exchange (2010). We exclude the closing auction from our analysis and discard trade and quote data with a timestamp after 17:15:00 (CET). the number of trades, coincides with a decrease in the overall trading activity reflected in total trading volume and the total number of trades. Overall, the fragmentation is increasing for all subsamples, however, the increase is more pronounced for the higher capitalized stocks.
Fragmentation and Market Quality
To Liquidity is well established as a multi-dimensional concept. Therefore, most authors use multiple measures for capturing different dimensions of liquidity, e.g., Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam (2000) and Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam (2001) . time dimension of liquidity into account and is calculated as
where p i and q i denote the price and the number of stocks traded and N s the number of trades within the one-second interval s. The depth dimension of liquidity is captured by calculating the dollar depth (D$ s ) as Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 We follow Gresse (2010) and provide a multivariate regression analysis of the liquidity measures. Two multivariate fixed effects regression models of spread and depth measures are presented, where fragmentation enters as independent variable in the second regression model. We define the first regression model as
where We expect market quality to deteriorate in turbulent market phases, i.e., increasing spread measures and a decreasing depth for high volatility and, therefore, a positive sign for the coefficient of σ for the spread measures and a negative sign for the depth measure. Market quality is expected to be higher for large stocks, which implies a negative sign of the coefficient of log MCAP and V for the spread measures and a positive sign for the depth measure.
We include company fixed effects, denoted by D i , in the regression model and use Newey-West standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We define the second regression model as
i.e., the fragmentation index F I i,t is also incorporated as independent variable. From Figure 2 , we expect fragmentation to be an indication of enhanced competition, which improves market quality for investors. Therefore, we expect the coefficient of F I to be negative for the spread measures and positive for the depth measure. The results for the two regression models are given in Table 4 for RS, in Table 5 for RS ef f and in Table 6 for log D$.
[Insert Tables 4-6 here]
The upper panel of Table 4 shows that the coefficient for log MCAP is negative and significant on the 1% level for the pooled sample which means that the relative spread is decreasing for higher capitalized stocks. This relation holds for the subsamples Stocks M and Stocks S. The coefficient for Stocks L is positive, although not significant. The sign of σ is positive which indicates an increasing relative spread for increasing intraday volatility. It is highly significant for the pooled sample and all subsamples. The coefficient of turnover is negative for the pooled sample and the subsamples and highly significant for the three subsamples, which indicates decreasing relative spreads for increasing trading activity. The adjusted R 2 for the pooled sample with the first regression model is 82%.
The second regression model in the lower panel of Table 4 includes fragmentation as independent variable. The coefficient of log MCAP remains negative and highly significant for the pooled sample. The signs of the coefficients for the subsamples do not change, however the result for subsample Stocks M loses significance. The results for σ and V are similar to the first regression model. The coefficient of F I is negative and significant for the pooled sample and the subsamples Stocks M and Stocks S which indicates decreasing spreads for increasing fragmentation. This is evidence for a positive effect of fragmentation on market quality. The adjusted R 2 s for all subsamples are higher for the second regression model which includes fragmentation as independent variable. Table 5 presents the results for the relative effective spread. They are similar to the results for the relative spread. The coefficient for log MCAP in both regression models is significantly negative for the pooled sample.
The positive sign for Stocks L is not significant. σ has a positive and highly significant coefficient in both regression models for the pooled sample and all subsamples and the coefficients for V are significantly negative for the subsamples and insignificant for the pooled sample. The lower panel of Ta Table 6 presents again regression results which include F I as regressor. The coefficient of F I is positive and highly significant on the 1% level for the pooled sample and all the subsamples which indicates that the dollar depth increases with increasing fragmentation for all subsamples. Adjusted R 2 s are also higher for the second regression model than for the first one.
So far the regression analysis of the liquidity measures provides strong evidence for increasing market quality in terms of lower spreads and deeper orderbooks related to the fragmentation of trading volume. Furthermore, the inclusion of the fragmentation index yields higher R 2 s for all three liquidity measures and all subsamples.
Analysis of Trade-Throughs
A trade-through is defined as an order, executed at a price, that is worse than the best quoted price, i.e., the stock could have been bought (sold) on another trading venue at a lower (higher) price. Table 7 shows the fraction of trade-throughs in terms of trading volume and the number of trades for the four trading venues.
[Insert Table 7 [Insert Table 8 here]
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results for the first regression model without market impact as independent variable. The coefficient of the relative spread is significantly negative for the pooled sample and for two subsamples because the probability of a trade-through increases when the spread between the best bid and ask price among all trading venues decreases. Cumulative dollar depth has a highly significant negative coefficient for the pooled sample and all subsamples.
The coefficients of #Shares, V 15 , σ real and Dir are all positive and highly significant for the pooled sample. This means that the probability of a tradethrough is generally higher for larger trades (higher #Shares), for trades during more active market phases (higher V 15 and σ real ) and for buyer initiated trades (Dir). Significance is confirmed by most of the subsamples.
The inclusion of market impact as independent variable leads to the results in Panel B of Table 8 . The coefficients of all independent variables and their significance are similar to the results in Panel A for all subsamples. The coefficient of MI is positive and highly significant for the pooled sample and for all subsamples, indicating that the probability of a trade-through is higher for trades which exhibit a higher market impact. Therefore, trade-throughs are mainly caused by informed traders, where execution speed has a higher priority than getting the best price over all trading venues. The robustness of this result is confirmed by the subsamples.
Panel C of Table 8 presents results for the second regression model, where we replace the consolidated liquidity measures by market specific liquidity measures. The relative spread of the respective market where the trade-through occurs is negatively related to the probability of a trade-through.
Intuitively, the probability of another trading venue offering a better price increases when the relative spread of a specific market increases. The coefficient of dollar depth on the respective market is also negative and significant, which means that cumulative dollar depth for the whole market and dollar depth on individual markets are negatively related to the probability of a trade-through. The coefficients of #Shares, V 15 , σ real and Dir are again all positive and highly significant for the pooled sample and robust for the subsamples. The inclusion of the independent variable MI, in Panel D of Table 8 , leads to similar results for the coefficients and the significance levels.
The coefficient of MI is positive and highly significant on the 1% level for the pooled sample and all subsamples, indicating again a higher probability of a trade-through for trades with higher market impact. The robustness of this relation is again confirmed by the subsamples.
The results of the two regression models provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that trade-throughs are caused by informed market participants for whom execution speed is more relevant than execution price. Therefore, the lack of a rule prohibiting trade-throughs does not necessarily deteriorate market quality. [Insert Table 9 here]
Trade-throughs should exhibit a higher relative effective spread as the execution price of a trade-through lies per definition outside the best prevailing bid and ask prices among all trading venues, whereas the execution price of an ordinary trade lies within. Indeed, Panel A shows that the overall mean relative effective spread is 3 bps higher for trade-throughs than for ordinary trades for the pooled sample and the overall median relative effective spread is 2 bps higher for trade-throughs than for ordinary trades for the pooled sample. These differences are significant on the 1% significance level which confirms that our algorithm identifies trade-throughs.
The results are robust for the subsamples, where the difference is lower for the subsample with higher capitalized stocks. The overall mean market impact is 5 bps higher for trade-throughs than for ordinary trades for the pooled sample and the overall median market impact is 3 bps higher for tradethroughs than for ordinary trades for the pooled sample. These differences are highly significant on the 1% significance level and are confirmed by all three subsamples, where again the differences are larger for subsample Stocks S, i.e., for the stocks with lower market capitalization. This evidence supports the hypothesis that trade-throughs do not express a lack of market quality, but instead are caused by a time over price priority of informed traders.
As Barclay et al. (2003) Table 9 reveal, the mean market impact for trades on the Swiss exchange is 3 bps higher for trade-throughs than for ordinary trades, but 6 bps higher for trades executed on a MTF. The differences are highly significant. The same holds true for the median market impact which is about 1 bp higher for tradethroughs than for ordinary trades on the Swiss exchange and around 4 bps for trades on MTFs, where all differences are highly significant.
The analysis of the subsamples shows that these differences are stable for different levels of market capitalization. The mean market impact of a trade-through against an ordinary trade is around 4 bps higher if the trade was executed on a MTF against the Swiss exchange for all three subsamples.
The same holds true for the differences in the median market impacts for Stocks M and Stocks S, which are around 4bps higher for trades executed on MTFs against trades executed on the Swiss exchange and about 2 bps higher for Stocks L. Overall, the analysis of trades executed on the Swiss exchange and on the MTFs provides evidence for the hypothesis that trade-throughs originate in the time over price priority of informed traders and are, therefore, not necessarily a negative by-product of the fragmentation of liquidity. We investigate a sample of 29 stocks from companies that are listed on the Swiss exchange and the three MTFs Chi-X, BATS Europe and Turquoise.
Conclusion
Several liquidity measures, such as spread and depth measures, are calculated for a long-term sample that covers 20 months. By means of multivariate regression models we determine the long-run effect of fragmentation on market quality and find no evidence for a deterioration of market quality in the aftermath of the implementation of MiFID. In contrast, we find significantly positive effects of the fragmentation on spread and depth measures, which are confirmed by the analysis of different subsamples.
Additionally, we examine determinants of trade-throughs by bivariate logistic regression models and find evidence that trade-throughs are caused by informed traders who consider execution speed as more important than the best available price. The analysis of the market impact, which is larger after a trade-through than after an ordinary trade confirms this result. This difference is even more pronounced for trades that are executed on an MTF.
Since previous studies found MTFs to attract more informed traders, this confirms that informed traders cause the trade-throughs. Our study provides evidence, that the fragmentation of trading in European equities markets did not deteriorate market quality, although a rule prohibiting trade-throughs is not included in MiFID. Table 4 -Relative Spread
The table shows the results from a regression analysis with relative spread RS (in bps) as dependent variable. The regressors are monthly averages of daily turnover V (in 1,000 CHF), the standard deviation of daily log returns σ (in %) and the logarithm of daily market capitalization log MCAP . Panel B also includes the fragmentation index F I, measured as reciprocal of a Herfindahl index based on the market share of the four trading venues Swiss exchange, Chi-X, BATS Europe and Turquoise as independent variable. The regression model includes company specific fixed effects, which are omitted for brevity. Results are presented for the full sample and for three subsamples of stocks, where Newey-West standard errors are used to test for significance. 
